Sodomy Laws: The Government\u27s Vehicle to Impose the Majority\u27s Social Values by Dayhoff, Aimée D.
William Mitchell Law Review
Volume 27 | Issue 3 Article 3
2001
Sodomy Laws: The Government's Vehicle to
Impose the Majority's Social Values
Aimée D. Dayhoff
Follow this and additional works at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews
and Journals at Mitchell Hamline Open Access. It has been accepted for
inclusion in William Mitchell Law Review by an authorized administrator
of Mitchell Hamline Open Access. For more information, please contact
sean.felhofer@mitchellhamline.edu.
© Mitchell Hamline School of Law
Recommended Citation
Dayhoff, Aimée D. (2001) "Sodomy Laws: The Government's Vehicle to Impose the Majority's Social Values," William Mitchell Law
Review: Vol. 27: Iss. 3, Article 3.
Available at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol27/iss3/3
SODOMY LAWS: THE GOVERNMENT'S VEHICLE TO
IMPOSE THE MAJORITY'S SOCIAL VALUES
Aim~e D. DayhoW
I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................... 1863
II. HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE ................................................... 1865
A. Biblical Foundation .................................................... 1865
B. From Early Colonial Period To Today ............................ 1866
III. T H E CASES ............................................................................ 1867
A. Griswold v. Connecticut .............................................. 1868
B. Bowers v. H ardwick .................................................... 1870
IV. THE PRIVACY DEBATE ........................................................... 1876
A. The First Amendment .................................................. 1877
B. The Fourth Amendment ............................................... 1879
C. The Fifth Amendment .................................................. 1881
D. The Ninth Amendment ................................................ 1882
E. The Fourteenth Amendment .......................................... 1884
F. Sum m ary .................................................................. 1885
V. THE CURRENT STATE OF MINNESOTA LAW .......................... 1886
V I. CONCLUSION ........................................................................ 1894
I. INTRODUCTION
In the past two decades, the Minnesota legislature has repeat-
edly been confronted with legislation aimed at repealing the state's
age-old sodomy' statute.2  Ultimately, the bills have met their de-
mise, even as recently as the past legislative session.3 On June 22,
2000, the Minnesota Civil Liberties Union ("MCLU") decided to
t J. D. Candidate 2002, William Mitchell College of Law; B.A., Indiana
University, 1996.
1. Sodomy is defined in Minnesota as "carnally knowing any person by the
anus or by or with the mouth." MINN. STAT. § 609.293, subd. 1 (1998).
2. Margaret Zack & Rosalind Bentley, MCLU Suing To Abolish State's Anti-
Sodomy Law, STAR TRIB., June 23, 2000, at Al (stating that several attempts have
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judicially challenge the constitutionality of Minnesota's sodomy
law. Minnesota's version of the law makes it illegal for both homo-
sexuals and heterosexuals to engage in consensual acts of sodomy.
5
The notion that sodomy should be forbidden by law is not a
new one, but rather one that has been around since the founding
of the thirteen colonies." As recently as 1961, all fifty states had anti-
7
sodomy laws. Today, however, only eighteen states have some
form of statute banning sodomy between either heterosexuals
and/or homosexuals.8
This article will trace the origin of sodomy laws from biblical
times to the present, highlighting both Griswold v. Connecticu? and
Bowers v. Hardwick1° as the two cases that forced the courts to begin
dealing with the right to privacy and its applicability to married
couples and homosexuals. The article will then examine Minne-
sota's right to privacy as found in the state constitution and analyze
its relevance in determining the unconstitutionality of Minnesota's
sodomy statute.
4. Id.
5. MINN. STAT. § 609.293, subd. 5 (1998).
6. David A. J. Richards, Constitutional Legitimacy and Constitutional Privacy, 61
N.Y.U. L. REv. 800, 808 (1986) (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 193-94
(1986)) (stating that all thirteen colonies at the time the Bill of Rights was ratified,
and all but five of the thirty-seven states when the Fourteenth Amendment was
ratified in 1868, had criminal sodomy laws).
7. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 193 (appealing to history in stating that until 1961, all
fifty states outlawed sodomy).
8. The following states prohibit same gender sodomy: Arkansas, ARK. CODE
ANN. § 5-14-122 (Michie 1999); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3505 (1995); Mis-
souri, Mo. ANN. STAT. § 566.090 (West 1999); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21
§ 886 (West 1983 & Supp. 2001); Texas, TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06 (Vernon
1994) (recently held unconstitutional in Lawrence v. State, Nos. 14-99-001009-CR,
14-99-00111-CR, 2000 WL 729417, at *1 (Tex. Ct. App.June 8, 2000)). The follow-
ing states prohibit both same gender and opposite gender sodomy: Alabama, ALA.
CODE § 13A-6-65 (1994); Arizona, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1411 (West 1989);
Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 800.02 (West 2000); Idaho, IDAHO CODE § 18-6605 (Mi-
chie 1997); Louisiana, LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:89 (West 1986) (recently upheld in
State v. Smith, 766 So. 2d 501 (La. 2000)); Massachusetts, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 272, § 34 (West 1990); Michigan, MICH. COMp. LAWS § 750.158 (1991); Minne-
sota, MINN. STAT. § 609.293 (1998); Mississippi, MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-59 (1972);
North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-177 (1999); South Carolina, S.C. CODEANN.
§ 16-15-120 (Law. Co-op. 1985); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5403 (1999); Vir-
ginia, VA. CODEANN. § 18.2-361 (Michie 1996).
9. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
10. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
11. This article will not address the constitutionality of forcible or public sod-
omy because numerous Minnesota cases have shown that even the broadest consti-
tutional interpretation does not allow for the protection of these kinds of sodomy.
1864 [Vol. 27:3
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Written references to sodomy date back to biblical times and
Hebraic law. 2 The Bible does not explicitly mention the word
"sodomy," but it does prohibit sexual relations between men."
Thus, the criminalization of sodomy stems from the Old Testa-
ment's prohibition on this type of behavior. The illegality persisted
throughout the medieval period in England where sodomy was
considered a religious offense. 4 Sodomy's criminal status crossed
the Atlantic to the British colonies in America, setting the stage for
the historical antecedent of the United States' prohibition of the
practice in modern times.1
5
A. Biblical Foundation
The word "sodomy" can be traced back to biblical times, and
the cities of Sodom and Gomorrah. 6 The two cities were destroyed
because of the inhabitants' godlessness. 7 The specific evil acts that
caused the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah are not set out in
detail, but several different biblical sections comment on the down-
fall of the two cities. 
s
Judaic law's views on sodomy persevered into the Middle Ages.
E.g., State v. Gray, 413 N.W.2d 107, 113-114 (Minn. 1987) (holding that public acts
of sodomy are prohibited and are not protected by a right to privacy); State v.
Witt, 245 N.W.2d 612, 615 (Minn. 1976) (holding that forcible sodomy is prohib-
ited under Minnesota law).
12. Harris v. State, 457 P.2d 638, 648 (Alaska 1969).
13. Id.
14. Id. (discussing early English law's view on sodomy).
15. Id. at 649. The court discusses the evolution of sodomy laws in England
and their incorporation into American law. Id.
16. Id. at 648 (stating that "[s]odomy appears originally as part of the Hebraic
law, taking its name from the practices reputedly indulged in by the inhabitants of
Sodom and Gomorrah"); Genesis 19:24-28 (describing the destruction of the two
cities). See also Arthur E. Brooks, Doe and Dronenburg: Sodomy Statutes Are Constitu-
tional, 26 WM. & MARYL. REv. 645, 648 (1985) (giving biblical background on sod-
omy laws).
17. 2 Peter 2:6, 10 (stating that "God condemned the cities of Sodom and
Gomorrah ... and made them an example of what will happen to the godless");
Genesis 19:5 (Today's English Version) (providing as one example of the godless-
ness of the people men wanting to have sex with other men).
18. Ezekiel 16:49 (stating that pride, greed, laziness and failure to aid the poor
all contributed to the demise of Sodom); Harris v. State, 457 P.2d 638, 648 (Alaska
1969) (referring to the Bible's prohibition of sex between two men); Brooks, supra
note 16, at 648 (referring to several verses in the book of Leviticus that prohibit
sexual acts, such as adultery, homosexuality, bestiality, and incest).
2001] 1865
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Its impact on England did not occur until the passage of the Stat-19
ute of Henry VIII. Before the birth of the Statute, sodomy was not
a recognizable common law offense. 20 Because early Anglo-
American law had its basis in English law, England's views on sod-
omy were incorporated into many states' statutory language.2'
B. From Early Colonial Period To Today
As the colonies formed, the need for local laws arose. As early
as the first American colony, Jamestown, the English influence on
legislating morality began to appear in the formation of the laws.2
The colonists dismissed sodomy as immoral and unchristian, just as
23
the Bible implicitly characterized it as a sin.
The early colonists' idea that prohibiting sodomy would pro-
24
tect morality is still alive and well today. Until the 1960s, no one
formally questioned the absence of a rational basis for the govern-
ment's prohibition of behavior that some simply believed to be
19. See Harris, 457 P.2d at 649 (stating that the Statute of Henry VIII outlawed
"buggery"). Buggery is defined as "sodomy or bestiality." BLACK's LAw DICrIoNARY
189 (7th ed. 1999).
20. Brooks, supra note 16, at 649.
21. See Harris, 457 P.2d at 649.
22. Brooks, supra note 16, at 649 (stating thatJamestown adopted the English
prohibition on sodomy in its first laws).
23. Id. at 649-50 (describing the Virginia legislature's disgust of the crime of
sodomy); Leviticus 18:22 ("Thou shalt not lie with mankind, as with womankind: it
is abomination); The Letter from Jude 1:7 (Good News) ("Remember Sodom and
Gomorrah, and the nearby towns, whose people acted as those angels did and in-
dulged in sexual immorality and perversion .... ").
24. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney for Richmond, 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1202
(E.D. Va. 1975) (stating that if the State believes punishment for private homo-
sexual practices is appropriate to promote morality and decency, then it may do so)
(emphasis added); Hayes v. Howell 308 S.E.2d 170, 176 (Ga. 1983) (declaring that
a state's police power gives it the authority to legislate for the protection of the citi-
zens' lives, health and property, and to preserve good order and public morals)
(emphasis added). See also Richards, supra note 6, at 811 (quoting Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 211 (1986)).
That certain, but by no means all, religious groups condemn the behav-
ior at issue gives the State no license to impose their judgment on the en-
tire citizenry. The legitimacy of secular legislation depends instead on
whether the State can advance some justification for its law beyond its
conformity to religious doctrine.
Id.; Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196 (declaring that no rational basis for the Georgia sod-
omy law exists except that a majority of Georgia residents believe that sodomy is
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"unacceptable. '2 5 As an example of cultural context, in the 1950s
and the 1960s, the shows on television depicted June and Ward
Cleaver-type families, in which sexual issues were never even im-
plied."
Now, however, our popular culture is filled with sexual scenes
on both daytime and nighttime television, and even homosexuality
has found its way into the confines of our homes with Emmy win-
ning shows like Will & Grace.17 Along with society's new social dis-
28course have come calls for changes in the laws.
III. THE CASES
Two United States Supreme Court decisions are crucial to the
current sodomy debate. In the first case, Griswold v. Connecticut,
29
the Court acknowledged that a right to privacy exists under the
federal Constitution. In the second case, Bowers v. Hardwick, the
32Court upheld Georgia's sodomy statute as being constitutional.
Close examination of both cases is necessary to fully understand the
controversy surrounding state sodomy laws.
25. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196.
26. Lili Levi, The Hard Case of Broadcast Indecency, 20 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE, 49, 50 (1992), which states:
In 1951, a television station in Houston caused a public outcry when it
planned to air a bedding commercial showing a husband and wife in a
double bed. ... In 1967, The Ed Sullivan Show required the Rolling
Stones to perform Let's Spend the Night Together as Let's Spend Some
Time Together. Id.
27. E.g., Michael Logan, Why Soaps Are So Sexy, TV GumE, Apr. 4-10, 1992, at
12, 14, 16, 21. See also The 73rdEmmy Awards (NBC television broadcast, Sept. 10,
2000).
28. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 188 (challenging the constitutionality of Georgia's
sodomy statute); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (legalizing a woman's
right to have an abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454-55 (1972) (hold-
ing that states could not deny contraceptives to unmarried people); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480 (1965) (challenging the constitutionality of Con-
necticut's birth control law); People v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936, 941 (N.Y. 1980)
(holding that because consensual sodomy lacked physical harm, no public interest
existed that warranted protection); Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 415 A.2d 47, 50
(Pa. 1980) (finding no justification for state police power to enforce majority mo-
rality).
29. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
30. Lackland H. Bloom, Jr., The Legacy of Griswold, 16 OHIo N.U. L. REv. 511,
511 (1989) (stating that Griswold was considered a landmark case for many rea-
sons, including that it recognized the right to privacy).
31. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
32. Id. at 196.
2001] 1867
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A. Griswold v. Connecticut
Griswold v. Connecticut is arguably the first case that really
brought the right to privacy debate to the forefront.3' The case
centers on a Connecticut law that forbade the use of contracep-
tives.
Two doctors were charged with violating the Connecticut birth
control law because they helped a married couple acquire
contraceptives. The doctors appealed their case to the United
States Supreme Court, contending that the Connecticut law
16intruded upon the right of marital privacy. The Court agreed
with them and reversed the Connecticut Supreme Court ofEF 7
Errors. The majority and concurring opinions disagreed on
which amendment of the Constitution secures a right to privacy,
but they all agreed that a right to privacy does indeed exist.
33. Stephen J. Schnably, Beyond Griswold: Foucaldian and Republican Approaches
to Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REv. 861, 863 (1991) (commenting that "Griswold was surely
an important development in the emergence of the modem constitutional right of
privacy...); Brooks, supra note 16, at 662 (dubbing Griswold the first privacy deci-
sion).
34. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 480. The statute's language reads as: "Any person
who uses any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of preventing
conceptions shall be fined not less than fifty dollars or imprisoned not less than
sixty days nor more than one year or be both fined and imprisoned." Id. (quoting
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-32 (1958)).
35. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 480.
36. Id. at 481.
37. Id. at 486.
38. Id. at 484. A portion of the majority opinion follows:
The foregoing cases suggest that specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights
have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help
give them life and substance. Various guarantees create zones of privacy.
The right of association contained in the penumbra of the First Amend-
ment is one ... The Third Amendment in its prohibition against the
quartering of soldiers 'in any house' in time of peace without the consent
of the owner is another facet of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment
explicitly affirms the 'right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.'
The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citizen
to create a zone of privacy which government may not force him to sur-
render to his detriment. The Ninth Amendment provides: 'The enu-
meration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to
deny or disparage others retained by the people.'
Id. (citation omitted); see also id. at 486-87 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (stating that
even though the right of privacy is not explicitly written in the Constitution, it is
referred to in the language of the Ninth Amendment); id. at 502 (White, J., con-
curring) (applying the Fourteenth Amendment's due process in believing the
Connecticut law to be unconstitutional). But see id. at 509 (Black, J., dissenting)
1868 [Vol. 27:3
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The majority in Griswold appeared to be offended by the idea
that the government would regulate what married couples do be-
hind closed doors.9 The Court championed the institution of mar-
riage and implied that allowing the government's invasion of mari-
40
tal privacy would undermine the personal nature of marriage.
Justice Goldberg, in his concurring opinion, focused his attention
on the notion of fundamental rights.4 1 He concluded that the right
42
to privacy is a fundamental right, derived from the Constitution.
(disagreeing with the majority and concurring opinions because no constitutional
provision exists that guarantees a complete right to privacy). "Penumbra" is de-
fined as "a surrounding area or periphery of uncertain extent; in constitutional
law, the Supreme Court has ruled that the specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights
have penumbras containing implied rights, esp. the right of privacy." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY, 1155 (7th ed. 1999).
39. 381 U.S. at 485-86 (stating that the idea that the government would police
marital bedrooms for signs of contraceptive use is repulsive to the concept of mar-
riage being a private institution between two people).
40. Id. at 486.
Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully endur-
ing, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that
promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political
faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an as-
sociation for as noble purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.
Id.; see also Schnably, supra note 33, at 861-62 (citing Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of
Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 739 (1989)) (arguing that "personhood" includes
the idea that a person's private life provides an escape from the state's power).
E.g., David A. J. Richards, Sexual Autonomy and the Constitutional Right to Privacy: A
Case Study in Human Rights and the Unwritten Constitution, 30 HASTINGS L.J., 957
(1979).
41. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 493. Justice Goldberg wrote:
In determining which rights are fundamental, judges are not left at large
to decide cases in light of their personal and private notions. Rather, they
must look to the 'tradition and (collective) conscience of our people' to
determine whether a principle is 'so rooted (there).. .as to be ranked as
fundamental.' The inquiry is whether a right involved 'is of such a char-
acter that it cannot be denied without violating those 'fundamental prin-
ciples of liberty and justice.. .which lie at the base of all our civil and
political institutions.'
Id. (citations omitted).
42. Id. (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) overruled in part by Berger v. State of New York, 388 U.S.
41 (1967) and Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). The Court stated:
The protection guaranteed by the [Fourth and Fifth] amendments is
much broader in scope. The makers of our Constitution undertook to
secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized
the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intel-
lect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of
life are to be found in material things. They sought to protect Americans
in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They
conferred, as against the government, the right to be let alone-the most
2001] 1869
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Justice White, in his concurring opinion, took issue with Connecti-
cut's claim that the statute served a vital state interest in discourag-
ing promiscuity and extra-marital undertakings. 3
Interestingly, the dissent agreed with all of the majority and
concurring opinions' reasons why the statute is offensive. 44 Never-
theless, Justice Black and Justice Stewart failed to find any constitu-
45tional provision that included and guaranteed a right to privacy.
This case achieved such significance because it laid the groundwork
for many more challenges to government's intrusion into all citi-
zens' private lives.
46
B. Bowers v. Hardwick
Compared to Griswold and subsequent cases, Bowers v. Hardwick
signals a divergence from the Supreme Court's continued expan-
sion of the scope of activities protected by the right to privacy.47
This case is different from the others previously cited because it in-
48volves the issue of homosexuality.
comprehensive of rights and the most valued by civilized men.
Id.
43. Id. at 505 (White, J., concurring). Justice White strongly voiced his opin-
ion in stating that:
[T]he statute is said to serve the State's policy against all forms of pro-
miscuous or illicit sexual relationships, be they premarital or extramari-
tal, concededly a permissible and legitimate legislative goal.... I wholly
fail to see how the ban on the use of contraceptives by married couples in
any way reinforces the State's ban on illicit sexual relationships.
Id.
44. Id. at 507 (BlackJ., dissenting); id. at 527 (Stewart,J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 510 (admitting to liking his privacy as much as anyone, but believing
the government does have a right to invade one's privacy absent a constitutional
provision saying otherwise); see also id. at 527 (stating that the Court must decide if
the statute is unconstitutional, not whether it is silly or unwise).
46. Shnably, supra note 33, at 863 (analyzing the importance of Griswold in
examining Roe v. Wade and Bowers v. Hardwick); see also David Helscher, Griswold v.
Connecticut and the Unenumerated Right of Privacy, 15 N. ILL. U.L. REv. 33, 50-52
(1994) (citing to many precedent-setting cases that arose out of Griswold); Bloom
Jr., supra note 30, at 511 (stating that another reason for Griswold's importance is
that it led to a line of controversial cases involving abortion).
47. Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747,
772 (1986) (giving women the right to choose whether or not to bear children);
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 113 (1973) (legalizing abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438, 438 (1972) (choosing to use contraceptives is a fundamental right);
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (allowing couples to marry interracially);
Griswold, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (declaring that the right to use contraceptives is
covered by a constitutional right to privacy).
48. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 188 (1986).
1870 [Vol. 27:3
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In the fall of 1982, Hardwick was charged with violating Geor-
gia's anti-sodomy statute by engaging in sodomy with another adult
male in his own home.49 Even though the District Attorney decided
against presenting the case to a grand jury, Hardwick brought suit
in federal district court.50 He alleged that the statute was unconsti-
tutional on several fronts, but the court dismissed his claim.51
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit then reversed
the district court, relying on the Supreme Court's reasoning in Gris-
52
wold. In a five to four vote, the Supreme Court reversed the
Eleventh Circuit's judgment.5 In delivering its opinion, the Court
seemed to lose sight of the fact that the Georgia statute applied to
both heterosexuals and homosexuals.54
49. Id. at 187-88. The Georgia statute reads as follows:
A person commits the offense of sodomy when he performs or submits to
any sexual act involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or
anus of another .... A person convicted of the offense of sodomy shall be
punished by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than 20 years
GA. CODE. ANN. § 16-6-2 (2000).
50. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 188.
51. Id. (stating that the district court granted Bowers' motion to dismiss on
the grounds that Hardwick failed to state a claim). See also Daniel Joseph Langin,
Bowers v. Hardwick: The Right of Privacy and the Question of Intimate Relations, 72 IowA
L. REV. 1443, 1453 (1987). The author explained how the district court relied on
Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney for Richmond, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), in
which the United States Supreme Court affirmed the federal district court's deci-
sion that Virginia's sodomy laws were constitutional. The federal district court
found the statute valid because no fundamental right to commit sodomy existed.
Id. (citations omitted).
52. Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202, 1210-13 (11th Cir. 1985) (stating that
sodomy was protected by the "quintessential privacy" derived from both the Ninth
and Fourteenth Amendments). The district court relied on Doe v. Commonwealth's
Attorney for Richmond, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), in dismissing Hardwick's
action due to his failure to state a claim. The Eleventh Circuit, however, felt that
because later decisions undermined Doe, Hardwick did state a valid claim. Bowers,
478 U.S. at 188-89.
53. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 187-89.
54. Id. at 190 (stating that the issue to be determined is whether a constitu-
tional provision exists that gives homosexuals the right to engage in sodomy); see also
Thomas B. Stoddard, Bowers v. Hardwick: Precedent by Personal Predilection, 54 U. CHI.
L. REV. 648, 652 (1987) (arguing that Bowers went from being a sex privacy case to
a gay rights case); Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REv.
1574, 1640-41 (1987). The author contends the state argued that Georgia's sod-
omy statute only applied to homosexuals by saying:
[H]omosexual sodomy is anathema of basic units of our society-
marriage and the family.. .if the legal distinctions between the intimacies
of marriage and homosexual sodomy are lost, it is certainly possible to
make the assumption.. that the order of society, our way of life, could be
changed in a harmful way. Id. (quoting Brief of Pet'r at 36-38, Bowers,
187120011
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The majority disputed the Eleventh Circuit's reliance on case
law by distinguishing the facts in those cases from the facts in this
case. All of the cases relied on by the Eleventh Circuit involved
56the notions of marriage, family, and procreation. In Bowers, the
majority failed to find that "the rights announced in those cases
bears any resemblance to the claimed constitutional right of homo-
sexuals to engage in acts of sodomy that is asserted in this case.""
The Court provided two tests for determining which individual
liberties are so important that they merit heightened judicial pro-
tection. 5s The first test involves fundamental liberties that are "'im-
plicit in the concept of ordered liberty' such that 'neither liberty
nor justice would exist if [they] were sacrificed."'5 9 The second test
consists of "liberties that are 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history
and tradition."' 60 Justice White, writing for the majority, failed to
provide a concrete answer as to why the Court rejected both tests in
its decision not to extend the right to engage in consensual sodomy
to homosexuals.61 The Court simply disposed of the two tests by
stating "[i]t is obvious to us that neither of these formulations
would extend a fundamental right to homosexuals to engage in
acts of consensual sodomy."62 The majority then appealed to his-
tory in reaching its conclusion, without providing an argument that
justifies treating homosexuals and heterosexuals differently under
Georgia's sodomy statute.!In his dissent, Justice Blackmun summed up the case as being
478 U.S. 186).
55. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190 (citing cases that dealt with child rearing, family
relationships, procreation, contraception, marriage and abortion).
56. The Eleventh Circuit relied on such cases as: Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967) that dealt with marriage, Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) that
dealt with family relations, and Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535
(1942) that dealt with procreation. Id.
57. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190-91.
58. Id. at 191-92.
59. Id. at 191-92 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937),
overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969)).
60. Id. at 191 (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)).
61. Id. at 195-96 (comparing homosexual sodomy to adultery, incest and
other sexual crimes).
62. Id. at 192.
63. Id. at 192-94 (pointing to original thirteen colonies' criminalization of
sodomy in dismissing the notion that the right to engage in sodomous behavior is
"facetious"); see also Richards, supra note 6, at 855 (pointing to the fact that the
Court offers no argument of principle in explaining its different treatment of ho-
mosexuals and heterosexuals under Georgia's anti-sodomy statute).
1872 [Vol. 27:3
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about "the right to be let alone" and nothing more.64 As was the
Court in Griswold, Justice Blackmun seemed greatly disturbed by
the idea that the government can regulate what people choose to
do behind closed doors.65 He went on to say that the courts could
not simply rely on their religious beliefs in upholding the validity of
Georgia's sodomy statute.6
The dissenting opinion also took issue with the majority's ap-
plication of the statute solely to homosexuals. 6' According to Jus-
tice Blackmun, the majority also misinterpreted Stanley v. Georgia.68
In Stanley, the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment
protects a person's right to have obscene reading material in the
privacy of one's home. 69 Hardwick relied on Stanley to support his
claim that when homosexual conduct occurs in theprivacy of one's
home, the outcome of the case should be different. Justice White,
writing for the majority, quickly dismissed the applicability of
Stanley to the case at hand by stating that Stanley "was firmly
grounded in the First Amendment. The right pressed upon us
here has no similar support in the text of the Constitution.... 71
Justice Blackmun, however, correctly pointed out that Stanley was
decided on the Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment's
special protection for an individual in his home.72
64. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 199 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (quoting Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928)).
65. Id. QuotingJustice HolmesJustice Blackmun states:
I believe that "[ilt is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law
than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more re-
volting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long
since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past."
Id. (quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV.
457, 469 (1897)).
66. Id. at 200 (criticizing the judicial system basing its conclusion on the fact
that people believe sodomy is unchristian).
67. Id. at 201, 209 n.4 (refuting the majority's comparison of homosexual
sodomy to incest, etc., by stating that there are sound differences between consen-
sual, private sexual acts and incest and adultery).
68. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
69. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 195 (discussing Stanley, 394 U.S. at 565).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 207 (Blackmun,J., dissenting) (quoting Stanley, 394 U.S. at 564-65).
The quote is as follows:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable
to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's
spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a
part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in ma-
terial things. They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their
2001] 1873
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Finally, Justice Blackmun disagreed with the state's claim that
to permit Hardwick's behavior would interfere with its ability "to
maintain a decent society." 3 He found that the state, as well as the
majority, failed to differentiate between "laws that7 protect public
sensibilities and those that enforce private morality."
Justice Stevens also wrote a dissent in which he addressed the
majority's decision to limit the Georgia statute only to homosexuals
engaging in private acts of sodomy. He asserted that two possible
rationales might exist to explain the maority's limiting of the stat-
ute's applicability solely to homosexuals. 
6
The first possibility he put forth was that homosexuals do not
have the same claim to liberty that the majority shares.77 He quickly
refuted this suggestion by pointing to the language "all men are
created equal" and interpreting it to mean that all people, regard-
78less of sexual preference, share the same interest in liberty.
Whether one is heterosexual or homosexual, deciding how to con-
duct one's self in both private and public is an intimate and indi-
vidual choice.79
The second possibility Justice Stevens offered was that the state
has the power to limit the scope of a general statute to apply only to
a certain class of individuals. As long as the state has a neutral
and legitimate interest in limiting the application of the statute, it
can do so. 8 1 Even so, Justice Stevens supported Justice Blackmun's
thoughts, their emotions and their sensations...These are the rights that
appellant is asserting in this case before us. He is asserting the right to
read or observe what he pleases-the right to satisfy his intellectual and
emotional needs in the privacy of his own home.
Id.; see also Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 66 (1973) (finding that the
Fourth Amendment, and not the First Amendment, supported the outcome in
Stanley, otherwise the Court would not have needed to narrow its holding on the
basis that "a man's home is his castle").
73. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 210 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Paris Adult
Theatre I, 413 U.S. at 59-60).
74. Id. at 212. See also O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975)
(holding that public intolerance cannot constitutionally mandate depriving a per-
son of physical liberty).
75. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 219 (StevensJ., dissenting).
76. Id. at 218-19.
77. Id. at 218.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 218-19 (stating that homosexuals and heterosexuals have the same
interest in deciding how to live one's life, both publicly and privately).
80. Id. at 218.
81. Id. See also Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 68-69
(1973) (stating that morally neutral justification is legitimate to protect society's
1874 [Vol. 27:3
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assessment that the state only put forth Judeo-Christian and preju-
dicial reasoning for its decision to limit the scope of Georgia's stat-
82ute. Because the anti-sodomy statute is rarely, if ever, used to
prohibit private, consensual sex, Justice Stevens opined that the
81majority's limited application of the statute was baseless.
The decision in Bowers is disturbing for the sheer reason that
the United States Supreme Court refused to extend to homosexu-
als the same rights as heterosexuals-the right to choose how to
conduct one's self in the privacy of one's home.84 Because the ma-
jority concluded that homosexuals have no fundamental right to
engage in consensual sexual acts behind closed doors, the Court
essentially gave the legislature a carte blanche to impose the major-
ity's will on disfavored groups in society. 5
The Bowers decision also left the door open to a possible exten-
sion of the Court's holding to heterosexuals. 6 Arguably, non-
interests).
82. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 211. Justice Stevens commented that selective applica-
tion of the statute must derive from something more than a disdain for homo-
sexuals. Id.
83. Id.at2l9n.11.
84. Mitchell Lloyd Pearl, Note, Chipping Away at Bowers v. Hardwick: Making the
Best of an Unfortunate Decision, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 154, 154 (1988) (citing to the out-
rage expressed around the country by gay rights organizations); Paula A. Brantner,
Note, Removing Bricks from a Wall of Discrimination: State Constitutional Challenges to
Sodomy Laws, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 495, 507 (1992) (stating that Bowers has
been a barrier to gays' and lesbians' ability to achieve legal protections); George
W. M. Thomas, Note, Privacy: Right or Privilege: An Examination of Privacy after Bowers
v. Hardwick, 39 SYRACUSE L. REv. 875, 895 (1988) (arguing that only if linked to
marriage, is the right to engage in private, consensual, sexual acts considered fun-
damental).
85. Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 488 (supporting the conclusion
that fundamental rights have heightened judicial protection); Brantner, supra
note 84, at 507 (quoting Cliff O'Neill, Three Years After Hardwick: Sodomy Laws Chal-
lenged State by State, TWN, June 28, 1989, at 3 (maintaining that the legislature re-
peatedly refers to Bowers in denying gays' and lesbians' rights); Joseph Robert
Thornton, Note, Bowers v. Hardwick: An Incomplete Constitutional Analysis, 65 N.C. L.
REv. 1100, 1118 (1987) (discussing the Court's possible discrimination against
homosexuals).
86. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 186, 219 (Stevens,J., dissenting) (stating that the Geor-
gia legislature did not use language that singles out homosexuals as a class that
merits special treatment under the anti-sodomy statute). See also id. at 200
(Blackmun,J., dissenting) (stating that the broad language of the statute indicates
that the law applies to homosexuals and heterosexuals alike); Kenneth L. Karst,
The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 664 (1980) (freedom of inti-
mate association provides the right to privacy and the invalidation of the anti-
sodomy statutes); Rhonda R. Rivera, Our Straight-laced Judges: The Legal Position of
Homosexual Persons in the United States, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 799, 943 (1979) (treating
homosexuals and heterosexuals the same under the language used in the anti-
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homosexual organizations could begin to challenge the constitu-
tionality of the heterosexual prohibitions in order to force the
87courts to sort out their reasoning in right to privacy cases. One
thing is for certain, the Supreme Court's decision in Bowers caused
both homosexuals and heterosexuals alike to rethink their strate-
88gies for successfully repealing anti-sodomy statutes. Instead of
contending that state sodomy laws violate the right to privacy pro-
tection under the federal Constitution, groups are looking to the
right to privacy protections embodied in their own state constitu-
tions.8 9
IV. THE PRIVACY DEBATE
The privacy debate dates back to the late nineteenth century
when Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis published a law re-
view article that highlighted the issue. 90 Since then, the Court has
tried to resolve the debate with cases like Griswold and Bowers. Even
though a century has passed since the issue's introduction into our
judicial system, the right to privacy still remains nebulous. 91 The
great confusion is the inability of the judiciary to agree on which, if
any, of the constitutional amendments actually protect and guaran-
tee the right to privacy.92 In order to fully understand the debate
sodomy statute).
87. Brantner, supra note 84, at 508-09 (arguing that non-gay organizations
may decide to challenge the constitutionality of anti- sodomy statutes because Bow-
ers provides solid ground for them to argue their case).
88. Id. at 497 (stating that Kentucky, Michigan and Texas have all had their
anti-sodomy statutes repealed based on state constitutional grounds).
89. Minnesota is the latest state in which groups are arguing that the state
sodomy statute is unconstitutional under the right to privacy, as found in the state
constitution. Zack & Bentley, supra note 2; see also Brantner, supra note 84, at 508-
09 (highlighting other states where groups looked to their state constitution in or-
der to declare sodomy laws unconstitutional).
90. Thomas, supra note 84, at 875 (citing Samuel D. Warren & Louis D.
Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193 (1890)).
91. Thomas, supra note 84, at 875. See also Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431
U.S. 678, 684 (1977) (stating that a zone of privacy exists, even though the right to
privacy is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (finding that unmarried couple's choice to use contracep-
tives fell within the zone of privacy); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 475, 484
(1965) (finding that the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments cre-
ated a "zone of privacy"); David D. Meyer, The Paradox of Family Privacy, 53 VAND. L.
REV. 527, 531 (2000) (stating that the Supreme Court privacy cases thus far have
only succeeded in creating a "doctrinal quagmire").
92. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 207 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(discussing the holding in both Olmstead and Stanley, in which the court relied on
1876 [Vol. 27:3
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over the right to privacy, close examinations of the First, Fourth,
Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments are necessary.
A. The First Amendment
The First Amendment protects the freedom of religion, speech
93
and the press. In Griswold, the Supreme Court cited to several
First Amendment cases in ultimately reversing the Connecticut Su-
preme Court and finding the Connecticut contraceptive statute to
be unconstitutional.9 4 The Court highlighted the notion that sim-
ply because a right is not expressly stated in any one amendment,
does not mean that the right is not or should not be protected.95
Stanley v. Georgia 96 is one of the first cases to determine that the
right to privacy is protected under the First Amendment.97  In
Stanley, police had a search warrant for Stanley's alleged bookmak-
ing activities and instead, discovered obscene material in a desk
18
drawer. Stanley was arrested for violating Georgia's obscenity
statute. 99 The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the trial court and
the First and Fourth Amendments to determine if a right of privacy exists); Carey,
431 U.S. at 674 (stating that the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed a right of
personal privacy); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 (referring to the First, Third, Fourth,
Fifth and Ninth Amendments as all creating zones of privacy). But see Bowers, 478
U.S. at 190 (holding by the majority that prior cases, which found a right to pri-
vacy exists to protect such fundamental rights as marriage, family and procreation,
are not applicable to homosexual behavior).
93. U.S. CONST. amend. I. "Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assem-
ble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." Id.
94. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482 (citing NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357
U.S. 449 (1958); W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); DeJonge v.
Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer
v. State, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) and stating that these cases all protect rights, such as
the right of association, which are not expressly included in the First Amend-
ment).
95. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482-83 (concluding that even though expression of
opinion is not explicitly included in the First Amendment, it exists as a constitu-
tionally protected right and discussing the fact that several rights are not expressly
mentioned in the Constitution, yet they have come to be protected under the um-
brella of the First Amendment).
96. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
97. Id. at 560-62 (distinguishing Stanley from previous cases that did not find
obscenity to be a protected right under the First Amendment).
98. Id. at 558.
99. Id. at 559 (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 26- 6301 (Supp. 1968)). The
statute reads:
Any person who shall knowingly bring or cause to be brought into this
20011 1877
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found that the states have the authority to deal with the situation as
they see fit because obscenity is not a constitutionally protected
right.
°°
The United States Supreme Court, however, felt differently
and reversed the Georgia Supreme Court, deciding that "mere pri-
vate possession of obscene material cannot constitutionally be
made a crime." 10 1 The Supreme Court's decision hinged on the dif-
ferentiation between commercial distribution of obscene material
and mere private possession of such material.02 The Court found
the state's case essentially to contend that it has the power to regu-
late the moral content of its citizens' thoughts.' 3 Furthermore, the
Court went on to reject the state's argument that exposure to ob-
scene material may lead to deviant sexual behavior or sexual vio-
lence. 1
0 4
In applying the decision in Stanley to current sodomy laws, a
differentiation may be made between an individual's private sexual
practices and an individual's sexual activity occurring in public.'
State for sale or exhibition, or who shall knowingly lend or give away or
offer to lend or give away, or who shall knowingly have possession of, or
who shall knowingly exhibit or transmit to another, any obscene matter,
or who shall knowingly advertise for sale by any form of notice, printed,
written, or verbal, any obscene matter.. if such person has knowl-
edge...be guilty of a felony, and, upon conviction thereof, shall be pun-
ished by confinement in the penitentiary for not less than one year nor
more than five years....
GA. CODE ANN. § 26-6301.
100. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 560 (stating that because obscenity does not qualify as
protected speech or press, the States can do as they please to protect their citizens'
welfare).
101. Id. at 559.
102. Id. at 563 (determining that previous cases may not be binding on private
possession of obscene material).
103. Id. at 566 (quoting Kingsley Int'l. Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684,
688-89 (1959)) (citation omitted). The Court essentially dismissed the state's ar-
gument stating: "[t] his argument misconceives what it is the Constitution protects.
Its guarantee is not confined to the expression of ideas that are conventional or
shared by the majority .... I" d.
104. Id. at 566 (pointing to the lack of empirical evidence and suggesting that
education and punishment for violating the law should be the deterrents used to
prevent crime).
105. Many cases enforce sodomy laws when the acts occur in public and fail to
discuss the applicability of the laws if the act were committed in the confines of
one's home. Christensen v. State, 468 S.E.2d 188, 190 (Ga. 1996) (Fletcher, P.J.,
concurring specially) (holding that the privacy rights protected under Georgia's
constitution do not extend to sexual acts committed in public areas). See also
Stewart v. United States, 364 A.2d 1205, 1207 (D.C. 1976) (stating that the appel-
lant concedes that his acts were not protected by the right to privacy because they
1878 [Vol. 27:3
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Referring to the Court's disagreement with the state's contention
that it has the authority to legislate morality, arguably it can be ex-
tended to include the prohibition of controlling an adult person's
sexual activities that occur behind closed doors.'5
B. The Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment protects the public from unreason-
able searches and seizures. 1°7 A number of cases have cited the
Fourth Amendment as protecting an individual's right to privacy.1°
In 1886, the United States Supreme Court went so far as to say that
'constitutional provisions for the security of person and property
should be liberally construed... It is the duty of the courts to be
watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any
stealthy encroachments thereon." 1°9 The right to privacy, as en-
compassed in the Fourth Amendment, has been declared by the
United States Supreme Court to be just as fundamental as freedom
of speech, freedom of religion and freedom of the press.110
occurred in public); Schochet v. State, 580 A.2d 176, 184 (Md. 1990) (holding that
the Maryland sodomy statute does not apply to consensual activity that occurs in
the privacy of one's home); State v. Gray, 413 N.W.2d 107, 114 (Minn. 1987) (de-
clining to create a fundamental right of privacy for those who engage in commer-
cial sex).
106. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 566. The Court finds that the state cannot legislate the
majority's notions of morality when it says, "[w]hatever the power of the state to
control public dissemination of ideas inimical to the public morality, it cannot
constitutionally premise legislation on the desirability of controlling a person's
private thoughts." Id.
107. U.S. CONST. amend. IV states that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.
Id.
108. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 475, 485 (1965) (stating that the previ-
ously cited cases demonstrate the legitimacy of the right to privacy); see also Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 646-47 (1961) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,
630 (1886), as declaring that the Fourth Amendment applies "to all invasions on
the part of the government and its employees of the sanctity of a man's home and
the privacies of life..."). In discussing the invasion of one's privacy, the Court
states that "[i]t is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers,
that constitutes the essence of the offense; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible
right of personal security, personal liberty and private property ...." Id.
109. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 635; see also Griswold, 381 U.S. at 509 (Black, J., dissent-
ing) (opining that the Bill of Rights should be read liberally).
110. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 656 (quoting Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 543-
2001] 1879
17
Dayhoff: Sodomy Laws: The Government's Vehicle to Impose the Majority's So
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2001
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
With regard to state sodomy laws, which deem private sodo-
mous acts as criminal, the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
Fourth Amendment is crucial. To condemn private sexual deal-
ings between two consenting adults as violating the law explicitly
undermines the notion that the Fourth Amendment exists "as pro-
tection against all governmental invasions 'of the sanctity of a
man's home and the privacies of life."" 2 Those states that criminal-
ize sodomous acts even between heterosexuals, regardless of the ex-
istence of a marital relationship, only succeed in undermining the
sanctity of marriage.
1 3
The states that criminalize sodomous acts between both homo-
sexuals and heterosexuals simply succeed in imposing the govern-
ment's morality on adults who have differing opinions on what falls
within the scope of immoral behavior. The state anti-sodomy stat-
utes are clearly in violation of the spirit of the Fourth Amendment's
purpose to protect citizens from the government's intrusion into
their houses, and thus, private lives.
44 (1897)). The Court talks of the significance of the right to privacy as found in
both the Fourth and Fifth Amendments when it says that "the freedom from un-
conscionable invasions of privacy.. .do enjoy an 'intimate relation' in their per-
petuation of 'principles of humanity and civil liberty (secured).. .only after years of
struggle." Id.
111. Referring to the U.S. Supreme Court decisions in Griswold, Mapp, and
Boyd.
112. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 (quoting Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630).
113. Id. at 486. The majority, in finding Connecticut's anti-contraceptive stat-
ute to be unconstitutional, said the following:
We deal with the right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights-older than
our political parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a coming
together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the
degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life,
not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not
commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a pur-
pose as any involved in our prior decision.
Id.; see also Bowers, 478 U.S. 186, 217-18 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that
when married couples are behind closed doors, they, and not the State, should be
able to choose how they conduct themselves). But see Schnably, supra note 33, at
876-77 (citing Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 973
(1991)). Some argue that governmental intervention is necessary to ensure that
women are no longer disempowered and subordinate. Several feminists believe
the bedroom to be a "place of coercion, an arena in which men dominate
women." Id. The following states have sodomy laws that pertain to both hetero-
sexuals and homosexuals: Alabama, Arizona, Florida, Idaho, Louisiana, Massachu-
setts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Utah and
Virginia. See generally Lesbian & Gay Rights: State Sodomy Statutes, at http://www.
aclu.org/issues/gay/sodomy/html (last updated Oct. 1999).
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C. The Fifth Amendment
The Fifth Amendment contains a due process clause that se-
cures protections from the government at the individual level.'
14
The right to privacy found in the Fifth Amendment is derived from
the Self-Incrimination Clause."5 Historically, the Fifth Amendment
prohibited governmental acts of arbitrariness." 6 A rational basis for
the law had to exist before the government could justifiably deny a
person or group of persons due process under the law." 7 In Gris-
wold, the Court applied a more stringent standard, determining
that the state must have a "compelling interest.
114. The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a GrandJury, except in
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual
service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject
for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall
private property be taken for public use, withoutjust compensation.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.; William N. EskridgeJr., A Tribute to Kenneth L. Karst: Desta-
bilizing Due Process and Evolutive Equal Protection, 47 UCLA L. REv. 1183, 1183
(2000) (arguing that the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause protects minority
groups when the majority despises them).
115. U.S. CONST. amend. V.; Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484. "The Self-Incrimination
Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not
force him to surrender to his detriment." Id.; see also Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191. The
Court, even though it declined to extend the Fifth Amendment to encompass the
right to privacy in relation to sodomy statutes, acknowledged that:
It is true that despite the language of the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments, which appears to focus only on the proc-
esses by which life, liberty, or property is taken, the cases are legion in
which those Clauses have been interpreted to have substantive content,
subsuming rights that to a great extent are immune from federal or state
regulation or proscription.
Id.
116. E.g., Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
117. EskridgeJr., supra note 114, at 1191. Eskridge analyzes the Fifth Amend-
ment's Due Process Clause and its significance in relation to the governmental jus-
tification forJapanese internment camps and racial segregation in schools. See also
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326 (1937), overruled by Benton v. Maryland,
395 U.S. 784 (1969) (stating that the State cannot restrict people's freedoms
unless a genuine public need exists).
118. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 497 (Goldberg, J., concurring). See also Bowers, 478
U.S. at 189. After the court of appeals remanded the case to trial, in order to pre-
vail, "the State would have to prove that the statute is supported by a compelling
interest and is the most narrowly drawn means of achieving that end." Id.; Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153-55 (1973)(stating that the State must demonstrate that
20011
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In Bowers, the state argued that Georgia's anti-sodomy statute
was necessary to protect its citizens from the adverse effects caused
by those who engage in sodomous acts.119 The Court ultimately
agreed with the state, even though the state lacked proof to support
its assertions that sodomous acts are "physically dangerous" or a
threat to the public's well being.
120
The Court supported the state's view that sodomous acts "for
hundreds of years, if not thousands, have been uniformly con-
demned as immoral. 12' The phrase "compelling interest" may be
vague, but nevertheless, the sheer fact that the majority may not
approve of such behavior because of certain religious beliefs,
clearly fails to reach the stringent standard set by the United States
Supreme Court in Griswold.
2 2
D. The Ninth Amendment
The Ninth Amendment provides protection for those funda-
mental rights that are not enumerated in the prior eight amend-
ments. 123 This Amendment has been referred to as the "forgotten
the regulation advances a "compelling state interest"); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 497
(quoting McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964)). "The law must be
shown 'necessary, and not merely rationally related to, the accomplishment of a
permissible state policy.'" Id.
119. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 208-09. The state contended that the "general public
health and welfare" may be affected by the possible spread of communicable dis-
eases and rampant criminal activity by those who engage in sodomy. Nevertheless,
the state failed to provide any evidence for its assertions. Id.
120. Id. Many others have put forth the argument that criminalizing sodomy
will help protect the public health. Janet M. LaRue & Rory K. Nugent, Williams v.
State: The Constitutionality and Necessity of Sodomy Laws, 29 U. BALT. L.F. 6,13 (1999)
(arguing that the State may exercise its police power to protect the public's safety,
which is what the state is trying to do by eliminating "unnatural or perverted prac-
tices" that resulted in the HIV/AIDS epidemic).
121. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 210. The crux of the state's argument, as well as the
basis for the Court's upholding of the statute, rests upon the belief that people
who engage in sodomous acts are immoral and they will corrupt society. Id.
122. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 497 (Goldberg, J., concurring); see also Bowers, 478
U.S. at 211-12 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing McGowen v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420, 429-53 (1961)). "The legitimacy of secular legislation depends ... on whether
the State can advance some justification for its law beyond conformity to religious
doctrine .... A State can no more punish private behavior because of religious in-
tolerance than it can punish such behavior because of racial animus." Id.
123. U.S. CONST. amend. IX. The Ninth Amendment states, "the enumeration
in the Constitution of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage
others retained by the people." Id.; Griswold, 381 U.S. at 488 (Goldberg, J.,
concurring) (pointing to the history and language used by the Framers to support
the proposition that the Ninth Amendment was created to protect the public's
1882 [Vol. 27:3
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amendment" because the United States Supreme Court has rarely• . 124
been asked to interpret it. Until 1965 and Griswold, the Supreme
Court had only referred to the Ninth Amendment in a handful of
cases. 2 5 Surprisingly, in reviewing the most well known right to pri-
vacy cases, the judiciary seems wary of delving into the Ninth





For example, in Bowers, the Court asserted that Hardwick did
not base his defense on the Eighth, Ninth, or Fourteenth Amend-127
ment. The dissent, however, pointed out that Hardwick did in1 " 128
fact invoke the Ninth Amendment in his defense. Not only did
Hardwick explicitly mention the Ninth Amendment in his defense,
but he relied on Griswold, which interpreted the Ninth Amendment
as protecting rights that may not be expressly enumerated in the
other amendments.
1 29
The Court's actions indicate that it did not want to address the
other fundamental rights that were not enumerated in the other amendments).
124. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 491 n.6 (Goldberg, J., concurring). The Court says
that even though it has rarely been called upon to interpret this Amendment, it
still merits attention. Id. at 490-91 (Goldberg,J., concurring).
125. Id. at 491 n.6 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (citing United Pub. Workers v.
Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 94-95 (1947)); Tenn. Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118,
143-44 (1939); Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 330-31 (1936); Loan Ass'n v. City
of Topeka, 87 U.S. 655, 662-63 (1874); and Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 388 (1798).
126. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 520 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black goes on to
say that the Framers did not intend the Ninth Amendment to bestow power upon
the Court to declare the unconstitutionality of laws that "offend what this Court
conceives to be the '(collective) conscience of our people' .... " Id. Justice Stewart,
in his dissent, provides the following reasons for the Court's distance from the
Ninth Amendment:
The Ninth Amendment ... which this Court held "states but a truism that
all is retained which has not been surrendered," was framed by James
Madison and adopted by the States simply to make clear that the adop-
tion of the Bill of Rights did not alter the plan that the Federal Govern-
ment was to be a government of express and limited powers, that all
rights and powers not delegated to it were retained by the people and the
individual States. Id. at 529-30 (citation omitted).
127. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196.
128. Id. at 201 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun sharply disagrees
with the majority's belief that Hardwick did not rest any of his defense on the
Ninth Amendment. In his dissent, Justice Blackmun points no further than
Hardwick's reliance on Griswold. Id.
129. Id. at 189. The court of appeals relied on Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Roe in
reversing the decision. See generally Griswold, 381 U.S. 479 (discussing the Framers'
belief that there are fundamental rights, other than those specifically enumerated
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merits of the Ninth Amendment and its application to the right to
privacy in the context of sodomous acts. Why the Court really failed
to address the Ninth Amendment argument is unknown. Yet, be-
cause Hardwick expressly referred to the Ninth Amendment in his
defense, the Court's statement that he did not suggests that it sim-
ply did not want to explore the possibilities for fear that the statute
would be found unconstitutional.
3 0
E. The Fourteenth Amendment
The Fourteenth Amendment has a due process clause like the
Fifth Amendment, but it also contains an equal protection clause.1
3 '
The Equal Protection Clause "requires the state to justify any dif-
ference in procedural or substantive treatment of one person vis-a-
vis another."  Essentially, the Fourteenth Amendment "absorbs
and applies to the states those specifics of the first eight amend-
ments which express fundamental personal rights.' 33 Interestingly,
often times the judiciary appears to use the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause inter-- 134changeably.'
130. This assertion can be derived from the adamant stance that the Court
took on sodomous acts being immoral, not "deeply rooted in this Nation's history
and tradition" and condemned by Judeo-Christian ethical standards. Bowers, 478
U.S. at 194-96; Thomas, supra note 84, at 893 (stating that simply relying on history
involves a "value choice in that the Court selects the history upon which it will base
its decision").
131. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Section 1 states the following:
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and sub-
ject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of
the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.
132. EskridgeJr., supra note 114, at 1188.
133. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 488 (Goldberg, J., concurring). See also Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
134. One legal scholar puts forth the following observation:
Academics and judges who believe that constitutional interpretation must
be faithful to the original meaning of constitutional texts are unlikely to
distinguish the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause ....
Academics and judges who believe that constitutional interpretation must
be faithful to normative visions ofjustice and citizenship are also unlikely
to distinguish between the clauses ....
EskridgeJr., supra note 114, at 1186 (citing Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62,
95-96, 96 n.1, 102-03 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491
U.S. 110, 137-41 (1989) (Brennan,J., dissenting); Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97
1884 [Vol. 27:3
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Arguments have been made both for and against using the two
clauses in an undifferentiated manner. One argument consists of
analyzing the two clauses' impact on groups considered to be mi-
nonties. The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause af-
fects individuals, whereas its Equal Protection Clause affects a
group of people.16 The Due Process Clause is more concerned
with "my" rights, while the Equal Protection Clause is more con-
cerned with "my" rights in relation to another person.1"
Arguably, different standards are applied to the two clauses:
the Due Process Clause is one of non-arbitrariness, and the Equal.. . . 138
Protection Clause is one of non-discrimination. Despite the dif-
ferent standards applied in determining the constitutionality of a
law, the Fourteenth Amendment requires that the states enforce
their laws in a just and equal manner.139  Unfortunately, Bowers
demonstrates that in spite of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Court allows the discriminatory and selective enforcement of sod-
omy laws.'40
F. Summary
Clearly, right-to-privacy protections exist within several of the
Amendments to the United States Constitution. This right to pri-
vacy can be interpreted to mean that criminalization of consensual
sexual practices that occur in the privacy of homes are a violation
(D.C. Cir. 1987)).
135. E.g., Eskridge Jr., supra note 114, at 1183. The author discusses one way to
view the difference between the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause and
Equal Protection Clause as they apply to minorities. Id.
136. William EskridgeJr. describes the difference as:
The Due Process Clause secures libertarian protections at the retail (in-
dividual) level that are important when the group is socially despised,
while the Equal Protection Clause potentially offers minorities wholesale
(group) level protections when (or if) the Court recognizes their legiti-
macy as partners in American pluralist democracy.
EskridgeJr., supra note 114, at 1183.
137. Id. at 1187-88. "The difference between the two clauses rests with whose
interest is being affected; is it simply my interest, or is it my interest and not
yours?" Id.
138. Id. at 1188.
139. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
140. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986). The majority refuses to
invalidate Georgia's sodomy law under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause, because "[t]he law, however, is constantly based on notions of morality,
and if all laws representing essentially moral choices are to be invalidated under
the Due Process Clause, the courts will be very busy indeed." Id.
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of a constitutionally protected right. The United States Supreme
Court, however, held in Bowers v. Hardwick that Georgia's choice to
criminalize sodomous acts between two consenting adults was con-
stitutionally sound. 14 Despite this ruling, the states themselves can
still recognize the right to privacy under their individual constitu-
tions."'
V. THE CURRENT STATE OF MINNESOTA LAW
In recent years, many states, which in the past had sodomy laws
in force, have since found them to be unconstitutional under theirS 143
constitutions. Many other states have repealed their laws through
legislative action.1 Nevertheless, Minnesota has yet to overturn
the state's sodomy statute through either the legislature or the ju-
diciary.145 Even so, Minnesota is considered to be a "very close"
141. Id.
142. Id. at 190. The Court, in rendering its decision, only examined the consti-
tutionality of sodomy laws under the federal Constitution. The Court stated that
"'[this case] raised no question about the right or propriety of state legislative deci-
sions to repeal their laws that criminalize homosexual sodomy, or of state-court
decisions invalidating those laws on state constitutional grounds." Id. (emphasis
added). Subsequently, Georgia's supreme court struck down the 182-year old sod-
omy law in Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18 (Ga. 1998).
143. In Georgia, Kentucky, Maryland, Montana, New York, Pennsylvania, Ten-
nessee and most recently, Texas, the state courts struck down the sodomy laws.
E.g., Powell, 510 S.E.2d at 18; Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky.
1992); William v. State, No. 9803603/CC-1059, 1998 Extra Lexis 260 (Bait. City
Cir. Ct. Oct. 15, 1998); Gryczan v. State, 942 P.2d 112 (Mont. 1997); People v. On-
ofre, 415 N.E.2d 936 (N.Y. 1980); Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 415 A.2d 47 (Pa.
1980); Campbell v. Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d 250 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996); Lawrence v.
State, Nos. 14-99-00109-CR, 14-99-00111-CR, 2000 WL 729417, at *1 (Tex. App.
June 8, 2000). But see State v. Smith, 766 So. 2d 501 (La. 2000). The Louisiana Su-
preme Court just upheld the 195-year-old "crime against nature" statute that
criminalizes private consensual acts between adults by relying on the U.S. Supreme
Court's holding in Bowers v. Hardwick Id.
144. Twenty-five states plus the District of Columbia have repealed their sod-
omy laws through legislative action. The states, as well as the year they were re-
pealed, are the following: Alaska (1980); California (1976); Colorado (1972);
Connecticut (1971); Delaware (1973); District of Columbia (1993); Hawaii (1973);
Illinois (1962); Indiana (1977); Iowa (1978); Maine (1976); Nebraska (1978); Ne-
vada (1993); New Hampshire (1975); New Jersey (1979); New Mexico (1975);
North Dakota (1973); Ohio (1974); Oregon (1972); Rhode Island (1998); South
Dakota (1977); Vermont (1977); Washington (1976); West Virginia (1976); Wis-
consin (1983); and Wyoming (1977). ACLU, Status of U.S. Sodomy Laws, at
http://www.aclu.org/ issues/gay/sodomy.htmi [hereinafter ACLU).
145. Minnesota Statute section 609.293 is still on the books. MINN. STAT. §
609.293 (1998). Jim Manahan, president of the MCLU, stated that even as re-
cently as the past legislative session, the legislature has repeatedly attempted to re-
1886 [Vol. 27:3
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state in terms of the possibility of and the willingness to overturnE46
the state sodomy law. Minnesota is the only state that received
the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force's "very close" rating,
while states like Alabama, Arkansas, Mississippi and South Carolina
received "long shot" ratings. 141
On June 22, 2000, the Minnesota Civil Liberties Union
("MCLU") and the American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") Les-
bian and Gay Rights Project filed a class-action lawsuit challenging
the state's sodomy statute. 48 Minnesota's sodomy statute makes it
illegal for both heterosexuals and homosexuals to engage in pri-
vate, consensual sodomous acts.149 According to the MCLU and the
ACLU, "the suit is being filed on behalf of a diverse cross-section of
state citizens, whose jobs, homes and relations with their children
are jeopardized by possible enforcement of the sodomy law."
150
The suit alleges that the sodomy statute is unconstitutional because
it violates an individual's right to privacy as protected by the Min-
nesota Constitution. TM The two organizations viewed the legislative
route as a dead end, so they exercised their only other option-
attempting to have the law repealed in the judicial branch. 15
The right to privacy is recognized in Minnesota. The Minne-
sota Supreme Court recognized an independent right to privacy
under the state constitution in State v. Gray,53 and it further clari-
fied its position in Jarvis v. Levine. 54 In Gray, the defendant en-
peal Minnesota's sodomy law to no avail. Zack & Bentley, supra note 2.
146. The National Gay and Lesbian Task Force ("NGLTF") rated each state as
"very close," "best chances," "not possible," and "longshots" regarding the possibil-
ity of the sodomy statutes being overturned. Brantner, supra note 84, at 533 n.219.
147. Id. at 521-533.
148. ACLU, ACLU Takes Aim at State Sodomy Law that 'Invites the State into Every
Bedroom in Minnesota, at http://www.aclu.org/news/2000/n062200e.html (here-
inafter Sodomy Law).
149. MINN. STAT. § 609.293 (1998).
150. ACLU, supra note 144. The people represented in the lawsuit include: a
quadriplegic man whose only form of intimacy is sodomy, a married elementary
school teacher, a lesbian attorney, a gay law student, a divorced gay man, and the
Minnesota Lavender Bar Association. All of these people could face some form of
legal action (i.e. loss of teaching credentials, eviction from rented home, disbar-
ment, and loss of visitation with children) due to their engagement in private,
consensual sodomy. Id.
151. Sodomy Law, supra note 148. The suit is not alleging that Minnesota's
sodomy law violates the federal Constitution. Id.
152. Zack & Bentley, supra note 2. The current president of the MCLU points
to the past failed attempts to repeal the law in the Legislature. Id.
153. 413 N.W.2d 107 (Minn. 1987).
154. 418 N.W.2d 139 (Minn. 1988).
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gaged in sodomous acts with a minor and was charged with violat-
ing Minnesota's sodomy statute. 55 In the course of Gray's case, the
United States Supreme Court decided Bowers v. Hardwick, in which• . 156
it found Georgia's sodomy law to be constitutional. The portion
of Georgia's sodomy statute scrutinized and upheld in Bowers was
very similar to Minnesota's statutory provision under which Gray
was charged.1
57
The Minnesota Supreme Court followed the Supreme Court's
lead in Bowers by refusing to expand the state constitutional protec-
tions to those that engage in commercial sex.158 The Minnesota
Supreme Court was not willing to broaden its reading of the state
constitution beyond the parameters that the Supreme Court estab-
lished under the federal Constitution. 59 Nevertheless, the Minne-
sota Supreme Court left open the possibility, that if raised properly,
privacy rights could be "expanded beyond federal holdings."- By
limiting its holding to only those that engage in commercial sex,
the court drew a distinction between those that engage in sodo-
mous acts commercially and those that do so privately.
A year later, the Minnesota Supreme Court further strength-
ened the notion that the state constitution guarantees a right to
privacy. 161 InJarvis v. Levine, the court found that a mental patient's
right to privacy was violated when medical personnel forcibly ad-
ministered neuroleptic drugs.162 The court based its holding on Ar-
ticle I, sections 1, 2, and 10 of the Minnesota Constitution. In its
155. Gray, 413 N.W. 2d at 108.
156. Id. at 109.
157. The Georgia statutory provision states: (a) A person commits the offense
of sodomy when he performs or submits to any sexual act involving the sex organs
of one person and the mouth or anus of another. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1984).
The Minnesota statutory provision states similarly: Subdivision 1. Definition.
"Sodomy" means carnally knowing any person by the anus or by or with the
mouth. MINN. STAT. § 609.293, subd. 1 (1987).
158. The court fails to mention the applicability of Gray's right to privacy ar-
gument in regards to private, consensual sodomous acts. The court merely says
"to say that there exists a fundamental right under our constitution to engage in
sodomous acts within a sex for compensation relationship.. .extend[s] that privacy




161. Jarvis v. Levine, 418 N.W.2d 139, 140 (Minn. 1988) (stating that the forci-
ble administration of medication without prior judicial approval violates a mental
patient's right of privacy under the state constitution).
162. Id. at 148.
163. Id. The Minnesota Constitution closely mirrors the U.S. Constitution.
1888 [Vol. 27:3
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decision, the court explicitly stated that the holding was "not pur-
suant to any law or provision of the United States Constitution.
' 64
In making this remark, as well as the "proper standing" comment
in the Gray case, the Minnesota Supreme Court seemed to be en-
couraging a broadened interpretation of the state constitution,
which could easily lead to the eradication of Minnesota's sodomy
statute.
In the recent complaint, Doe v. Ventura, a diverse cross-section
of Minnesota citizens is being represented. Minnesota's sodomy
statute criminalizes both heterosexuals and homosexuals engaging
in sodomous acts; therefore, the statute goes beyond discrimination
based on sexual orientation and actually regulates sexual tech-
niques of everyone, including traditional heterosexual couples.1
6
But those who most likely will experience a more realistic threat
from the archaic state sodomy statutes are members of the gay and
167lesbian community.
The mentioned sections are as follows:
Section 1. Government is instituted for the security, benefit and protec-
tion of the people, in whom all political power is inherent, together with
the right to alter, modify or reform government whenever required by
the public good.
Section 2. No member of this state shall be disenfranchised or deprived
of any of the rights or privileges secured to any citizen thereof, unless by
the law of the land or the judgment of his peers. There shall be neither
slavery nor involuntary servitude in the state otherwise than as punish-
ment for a crime of which the party has been convicted.
Section 10. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not
be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the person or things to be seized.
MINN. CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 2, 10.
164. Jarvis, 418 N.W.2d at 148.
165. Sodomy Law, supra note 148.
166. Most Minnesotans fail to realize that the statute applies to their own sex-
ual practices. MCLU legal counsel Teresa Nelson sums it up best as "[p]eople of
all backgrounds and from across the ideological spectrum ought to be alarmed by
this law: it invites the state into every bedroom in Minnesota." Id. Joni Thome,
president of the Lavender Bar Association, shares Ms. Nelson's concern in stating
that "this [statute] affects every person in Minnesota who is sexually active." Zack
& Bentley, supra note 2.
167. Even the executive director of the Minnesota Family Council, Tom Prich-
ard, supports this statement when he says that "the state should be involved in
regulating private sexual behavior, but not when it comes to married heterosexual
couples." Zack & Bentley, supra note 2. Beth Zemsky, executive director of the
University of Minnesota's Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, Transgender Programs Office
responds to Mr. Prichard's assessment of the statute by saying that, "[Mr. Prich-
18892001]
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Many argue that the mere existence of sodomy laws is mean-
ingless because they are rarely enforced.' 68 While this may be true,
as thousands of laws fill our statute books and many are not en-
forced, 169 reaching the conclusion that such laws are without con-
sequence is inaccurate. Numerous incidents have occurred
throughout the country that expressly disprove the harmlessness of
sodomy statutes. 170 The simple existence of these laws can result in
many people being deprived of opportunity and living with fear of
prosecution due to their indirect enforcement.
7'
Employment discrimination is one such way that state sodomy
laws are indirectly enforced. Throughout our nation's history, ho-
mosexuals have been deprived opportunities that have been readily
available to others. 17  The federal government willingly labeled
gays and lesbians as "generally unsuitable" to hold government of-
ard] is voicing the common perception of the sodomy law," that it only applies to
homosexuals. Id.
168. See generally Chris Bull, Scene of the Crime - Laws Against Gay Sex Can Block
Everything We Want: Marriage, Adoption, and Equal Rights, ADVOC. Oct. 27, 1998,
available at http://www.aclu.org/issues/gay/advocateartl.html.
169. After his retirement, Justice Powell conceded to probably making an error
in upholding Georgia's sodomy statute; he based his vote on "the face that the
statute had not been enforced for several decades." Ruth Marcus, Powell Regrets
Backing Sodomy Law, WASH. POST, Oct. 26, 1990, at A3. "[I] t would be absurd to
pretend that all criminal statutes are adequately enforced". Poe v. Ullman, 367
U.S. 497, 512 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting). William EskridgeJr., a Georgetown
University law professor and author of many books on law's effects on the gay
community, remarked that " [ t] hese days, hardly anyone is prosecuted for private,
consensual acts of sodomy." Gays Make Progress on Sodomy Laws, Am. Civil Liberties
Union News, at http://www.aclu.org/news/w072597b.html. (July 25, 1997); see also
Cass R. Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. CHI. L. REV.
653, 678 n.143 (1985) (stating that prosecutors serve as safeguards against out-
dated statutes).
170. The most prominent case is Bowers v. Hardwick, in which police went to
Michael Hardwick's house with an arrest warrant, and when they entered the
house, Hardwick was engaged in sodomous acts with another male. The police
charged him under Georgia's 182-year-old sodomy statute. Bowers, 478 U.S. 186,
186 (1986). Another notable incident arose in Rhode Island in 1997 when two
men walked into the woods to have sex. One of the men went to the police to re-
port that the other man had stolen his wallet. Police then charged the victim with
"abominable and detestable crime[s] against nature." Bull, supra note 168.
171. Christopher R. Leslie, Creating Criminals: The Injuries Inflicted by "Unen-
forced" Sodomy Laws, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 103, 104 (2000). The author dis-
cusses the abuse of sodomy statutes in discriminating against gays and lesbians in
general, against their organizations, and in creating bias against gay and lesbian
parents in custody disputes. Id.
172. E.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Challenging the Apartheid of the Closet: Establish-
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fc s113 -1 174 . ,175fices, as "vulnerable to blackmail," as "sexual criminals, and• • ,,176
as demonstrating "lack of regard for the laws 
of society.
Besides experiencing discrimination within the government,
homosexuals experience employment discrimination in the private
sector as well. As mentioned in the Doe complaint, a gay law stu-
dent, who was preparing to sit for the bar exam at the time the
complaint was filed, feared that he would fail to receive his license
to practice law because his sexuality may suggest that he engages in
illegal activities.7 7 His concern is not without merit considering the
decision in State ex rel. Florida Bar v. Kimball. 17  In this case, the
court disbarred a practicing attorney. 179 The court's disbarring of
the attorney was based, in part, on the existing state sodomy 
law. i °
Even though no recent cases of disbarment have been based on an
attorney's sexual orientation, the fact that at least one has occurred
in the past is enough to warrant alarm.
In terms of judicial employment, gays and lesbians have re-
ceived disdain as well. In Minnesota, an openly gay judge was re-
moved from the bench because he "may" be violating Minnesota's
sodomy law. 81 In North Carolina, an openly gay judge was accused
of creating a conflict between being one who upholds the laws of
the state, and one who openly breaks the state sodomy laws."' As
recently as 1997, homosexuals testified at congressional hearings
for the Employment Non-Discrimination Act about their termina-
tion or denial of promotions due to their sexual orientation.11
3
Even as our country becomes more tolerant of alternative lifestyles,
the homosexual community still experiences employment dis-
173. Leslie, supra note 171, at 137 n.231 (quoting Patricia A. Cain, Litigating for
Lesbian and Gay Rights: A Legal History, 79 VA. L. REV., 1551, 1565-66 (1993)).
174. Id. at 138 n.233.
175. Id. at 138 n.237 (quoting Exec. Order No. 10450, § 8, 18 Fed. Reg. 2489
(1953)).
176. Id. at 138 n.242 (quoting High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance
Office, 668 F. Supp. 1361, 1363, 1365 (N.D. Cal. 1987), rev'd. 895 F.2d 563 (9th
Cir. 1990).
177. Zack & Bentley, supra note 2.
178. 96 So. 2d 825, 825 (Fla. 1957).
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. SandraJ. Grove, Constitutionality of Minnesota's Sodomy Law, 2 LAW & INEQ.
521, 534 (1984) (stating that the judge "openly contemplated future violation of
[the sodomy statute] in mature homosexual relationships with his adult male
peers").
182. Leslie, supra note 171, at 141-42.
183. Id. at 141.
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crimination at every level and in every sector.
Yet another way sodomy laws are indirectly enforced is through
custodial discrimination. Custodial issues are one of the most liti-
gated issues affecting homosexuals today.8 4 The courts rely on the
state sodomy laws in denying gay parents visitation and custody• - 185
rights, as well as in taking children away from parents who are186
gay. The Doe complaint filed in Minnesota also represents a gay,
divorced man who fears losing visitation with his children as a re-
sult of the state sodomy statute. If Minnesota were to follow
other states' leads in the realm of homosexual custodial issues, then
his fear would be well founded.'
The rationale behind automatically associating gays with illegal
activity is faulty and troublesome. The presumption that because
people are gay, they clearly commit criminal acts is a belief shared
by many. For example, just as recently as thisJuly, the Chairman of
Equal Rights not Special Rights, Phil Burress, called for the arrest
of Arizona Representative Jim Kolbe. 89
Mr. Kolbe is the only openly gay Republican in the House of
Representatives. 90 Mr. Burress sent a letter to Jim Nicholson, Re-
publican National Committee Chairman, in response to Represen-
tative Kolbe's upcoming address at the Republican National Con-
vention.1M He called for Mr. Kolbe's arrest because he clearly
engages in sodomy, which is illegal in Arizona.19 Mr. Burress failed
184. Id. at 148 n.302 (citing Rhonda R. Rivera, Recent Developments in Sexual
Preference Law, 30 DRAKE L. REV. 311, 327 (1981)).
185. Id. The author contends that sodomy laws will become even more impor-
tant in denying homosexual parents custody and visitation rights, once more re-
search disproves any negative mental effects on children of gay parents. Id. at 148
n.304.
186. Id. at 149. The argument is put forth that because gay parents are "crimi-
nals," they should not be granted custodial rights. Id. See also Bottoms v. Bottoms,
457 S.E.2d 102 (Va. 1995).
187. Zack & Bentley, supra note 2.
188. Both Alabama and Virginia have repeatedly held that homosexual parents
are not entitled to custody of their children due to their engagement in illegal ac-
tivities. In re R.W., 717 So. 2d 793, n.96 (Ala. 1998); Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691
(Va. 1985).




192. Mr. Burress stated in his letter that "Mr. Kolbe as a self-described homo-
sexual means nothing except to say that he engages in sodomy. Did you know that
in Arizona, sodomy is against the law? Mr. Kolbe should be arrested when he re-
turns to his home state for violating state law." Id.
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to quote witnesses or offer proof to support his assertions. He sim-
ply made the allegation and then allowed it to be posted on the
Internet, accompanied by a message urging people to contact
Chairman Nicholson to voice 
their concern.
In response, the ACLU points to Mr. Burress' letter in support-
ing its belief that sodomy laws do pose a threat to the gay and les-
bian community. 94 Just as North Carolina used its state's sodomy
law to remove a judge from the bench, Mr. Burress and others
would like to remove Representative Kolbe from office for violating• 195
Arizona's sodomy law. Possibly the real reason Mr. Burress would
like to have Representative Kolbe arrested is not because he vio-
lated a law, but because Mr. Burress would like to impede or pro-
hibit Representative Kolbe from being a representative of the peo-
ple because his behavior is not viewed as being moral.96
Mr. Burress was not alone either. The Mississippi-based
American Family Association voiced its support for Mr. Burress'
contention by posting his letter on its website and referring to him
as "AFA's good friend and ally, [who] shared his excellent let-
ter .... 197 All of these various incidents around the country high-
193. In a phone interview, Mr. Burress said that the letter to Mr. Nicholson was
meant to be personal and tongue-in-cheek. The circulation on the Internet oc-
curred without his permission. He said, however, that he sent the letter to call at-
tention to the fact that Representative Kolbe probably or may engage in sodomous
acts, and because he took an oath to uphold the laws of the land, he should be
held accountable if he fails to do so. Credibility is the issue. On sodomy laws in
general, Mr. Burress believes that both homosexual and heterosexual anal sodomy
should be criminalized because those acts lead to the spreading of deadly diseases,
namely HIV/AIDS. He feels that if the government criminalizes that type of be-
havior, coupled with an educational campaign, lives may be saved. Telephone In-
terview with Phil Burress, Chairman, Equal Rights not Special Rights (October 20,
2000).
194. ACLU, Calls for Arrest of Openly-Gay GOP Convention Speaker Reveal Danger of
Sodomy Laws Nationwide, ACLU Says, at http://www.aclu.org/news/2000/n073 10
0b.html (July 31, 2000). Michael Adams, associate director of the ACLU Lesbian
and Gay Rights Project, claims that "groups argue that these laws are not enforced
and do not present any real danger-but that they should remain on the books to
send a moral message ... [these laws] can be used to try to intimidate and silence
lesbian and gay Americans." Id.
195. American Family Association, supra note 189. In his letter to Jim Nichol-
son, Mr. Burress posed the question "[w]ould you agree that all lawmakers should
insist that all laws be enforced?" Id.
196. Id. Others voiced their concern over Representative Kolbe speaking at
the Republican Convention; one in particular told ABC News that he was "flabber-
gasted" by the decision to let him speak. Id.
197. Id. As mentioned earlier, Mr. Burress said that he did not give permission
for his letter to be circulated. Telephone Interview with Phil Burress, Chairman,
2001] 1893
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light the danger that could and does result from the mere exis-
tence of these statutes.
VI. CONCLUSION
Despite legal debate around various amendments to the U.S.
Constitution, because the United States Supreme Court upheld
Georgia's sodomy law under the United States Constitution in
Bowers v. Hardwick, the argument that state sodomy laws violate the
right to privacy as protected under the federal Constitution no
longer wields influence. Now, however, states are beginning to find
that their sodomy laws violate a person's right to privacy as pro-
tected under their own constitutions. The Minnesota Supreme
Court recognized a broad right to privacy guaranteed under its own
constitution over a decade ago in State v. Gray. With the MCLU's
and ACLU's current suit, Doe v. Ventura, Minnesota's courts have a
long overdue opportunity to overturn Minnesota's sodomy law and
eliminate the government's ability to selectively enforce this archaic
law against certain groups in society. Now is the time for the Min-
nesota judiciary to prohibit the policing of its citizens' bedrooms.
Equal Rights not Special Rights (October 20, 2000).
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